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JPRS L/8397

12 April 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 22/79)

WEST

EUROPE

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

GUENA-CHIRAC FINAL SPLIT TRACED

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 10 Mar 79 p 80

[Article by Ghislaine Ottenheimer: "Guena and Chirac, the Story of their 'Divorce'"]

[Text] "I'm leaving." Monday 5 March, 1600 hours, this is the announcement Yves Guena, Jacques Chirac's political advisor, has just made to him. The president of the RPR [Rally for the Republic], tanned and in his shirt sleeves, stretched out on the bed in his room at the Paris City Hall, leaps up: "Where are you going?"

"I'm leaving the administration of the RPR. I am your political advisor, but since I no longer have the means to exercise my functions, I am giving them up." Yves Guena's announcement recalls nearly word for word the utterance of Chirac in August 1976, when he resigned his job as prime minister. After a weighty silence, he continues: "I agree with the party line of the RPR, but I can accept neither the present organization of the movement nor its attitude toward the parliamentary group. I am in favor of group unity at any cost. A year ago you enjoyed a remarkable image in the country. But since that time it has deteriorated. What is more, I believe that you have been misled and that you will end up as nothing. Guena gets up from his armchair to give more weight to his words.

"Sit down," asks Chirac. "I can't talk to you when you are standing. Listen, wait. I can ask that much of you. You can't tell me at 1600 hours that you are leaving at 1700."

"No argument can deter me."

"Wait, you can't realize the blow you are striking at me. I have plans for you."

"My decision is irrevocable!"

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That same morning Guena has his desk at the Rue de Lille emptied in order to get settled in his offices at the Lower House. In order to avoid any discussion, he will not see any of his colleagues nor put in an appearance the next day at the RPR central committee offices. The news will be made public Tuesday morning. No interview, no radio, no television. The gesture is enough. Guena goes back home to the Dordogne.

At the beginning of February, he had conveyed his dissatisfaction: "I am not even being consulted any longer." The mayor of Paris had promised to arrange things, but nothing had changed. Before leaving for the Antilles to attend the parliamentary sessions, Guena had met with Chirac.

In Guadeloupe, the political advisor of the RPR felt more and more relegated to the background. He was informed about the request for an extraordinary session at the last minute. After all, communication between Paris and Pointe-a-Pitre is difficult. He was not even aware that on 28 February, Chirac had given an interview to LE MONDE. "Not true," claimed the members of Chirac's entourage, "the text had been sent to him by teletype." And it actually had been sent, but only several hours before its publication.

After the initial shock and feelings of sadness caused at the Chirac headquarters by the departure of this most faithful of all faithful companions, there followed a defense reflex. Guena was the only public personality of the former "gang of four." "The only one acceptable," said the wicked tongues. A follower of de Gaulle as early as 19 June 1940, a representative from Perigueux for the past 17 years, a former minister of General de Gaulle, and a dyed-in-the-wool anti-Giscardian, at the Rue de Lille, at the headquarters of the RPR, he was the last of the historical Gaullists; and along with Michel Debre the speaker most applauded by the militants. A clever debater and a specialist in the creation of shock formulas, he was also a valuable spokesman. With his departure, no one is left in Chirac's entourage except second-generation Gaullists and the followers of Pompidou and Chirac.

After Alain Peyrefitte, Alexandre Sanguinetti and Jerome Monod, he is now the fourth former secretary general of the movement to come out in opposition, not to Chirac himself, who remains the undisputed and indisputable leader, but to Chirac's "secret entourage."

The reaction was immediate. Tuesday afternoon, at the Intercontinental Hotel, at the meeting of the central committee convened to prepare for the national sessions on Europe, Chirac explained that Guena had resigned "for personal reasons."

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"He occasionally had these moods. And in political actions there is no room for self-doubt," confided Charles Pasqua, the man in charge. Less than 2 1/4 hours after the announcement of Guena's departure, Chirac had found a replacement for him: the president of the parliamentary group, Claud Labbe.

Guena had always been somewhat unbending and at times abrupt with people. Labbe is conciliatory. He has been able to preserve the unity of the group. His nomination is a clever way to recruit representatives on the eve of the European elections.

But here is a strange coincidence: at the moment when the RPR is hardening its attitude vis-a-vis the Government, Chirac chooses as political advisor the one RPR official who meets regularly with the prime minister and the president of the republic.

Will he be able to make the voice of the majority heard at RPR headquarters, in accordance with the promptings of Matignon; or will he be persuaded to align himself with the president of the RPR on non-negotiable issues? When on 28 February at the Pointe-a-Pitre Airport, Chirac let him know by telephone his decision to request an extraordinary session of the Lower House, Labbe replied: "That is not Gaullist." Twenty minutes later he came around to the proposal of Chirac.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

DISSIDENT PCF INTELLECTUALS PREDICT--The 23d [PCF] congress will result in a return to the policy of dependence on Moscow; it will mark the end of Eurocommunism. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 6 Apr 79 p 67]

FUTURE OF CGT--Edmond Maire [secretary general of the CFDT], commenting on the renewed assumption of PCF control over the CGT: "The 23 March Paris demonstration [marked by leftist violence] resembled Soviet tanks crushing the 40th congress of the CGT and its hopes for future respectability." [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 6 Apr 79 p 67]

BARRE INACTION ASSAILED--Representatives of the majority and members of the business community are assailing [Prime Minister Raymond] Barre for his failure to buy back LE PROGRES, [daily newspaper] of Lyon, or at least to prevent its acquisition by [fnu] Lignel, a businessman "who leans to the left." They cannot understand how the prime minister could "throw away" a department where he was elected and where he still has ambitions. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 26 Mar 79 p 15]

GISCARD PROPOSAL NOTED--Valery Giscard d'Estaing expects to propose an EEC-CEMA summit meeting to the Soviet leaders during his forthcoming official visit to Moscow. His trip is being prepared by Edgar Faure, president of the Franco-Soviet Friendship Group in the National Assembly. Faure maintains good relations with one of the principal editors of PRAVDA, Yuri Zhukov, and with the vice-president of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Vassili Kuznetsov. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 26 Mar 79 p 15]

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MILITARY SATELLITES RECOMMENDED--Satellites for military applications, launched by the Ariane rocket, are the latest project being recommended by the general staff. France would need two categories of satellites: one for communications (over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans) and one for strategic reconnaissance (which would increase the credibility of the nuclear strike force). /Text/ /Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 2 Apr 79 p 21

PCF'S JEWISH FILES--Numerous Parisian Jews were surprised to receive a PCF-JEWISH POPULATION LIAISON BULLETIN /Bulletin de liaison du parti communiste francais avec la population juive/ when they had never had the slightest contact with the PCF. Some received this bulletin at addresses where they had just moved in, which fact precluded misuse of any list of Jewish community services wrongly furnished to a political party. On the contrary, this lends credence to the idea that the PCF keeps an eye on this particular group of citizens. /Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 2 Apr 79 p 21/

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

POST-ELECTION RESULTS PUBLISHED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 18 Mar 79 pp 26-29

[Text] On 1 March, Spaniards proved that the long experience of 40 years of dictatorship has not obliterated their political ideas, and that when they go to the polls they know for whom they are voting and why.

This is one of the first conclusions that one reaches upon analyzing the results of the recent elections and comparing them with those of 15 June 1977.

In the two convocations to the polls, Spaniards have maintained virtually the same voting trend, which goes to show that there was no provisional quality in the 1977 elections, nor any voting out of fear, as the Communist Party claimed to explain its slight success in those elections.

The lack of practice in exercising suffrage caused many political observers to think that the 1977 elections would show results that were not commensurate with those of elections called subsequently.

The Same Trend

The facts proved the contrary. The same voting trend that was noted in 1977 is what occurred 2 years later.

In those first elections, UCD [Democratic Center Union] obtained a total of 274 members of parliament (deputies plus senators); and, on 1 March, it won 287. The PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], in turn, won 183 in 1977, and the figure on 1 March rose to 189. The PCE [Spanish Communist Party] vote rose from 21 to 23; and the Democratic Coalition [CD] which, 2 years ago, appeared as Popular Alliance [AP], is the only one with a decline, from 18 to 11.

On 1 March, nearly 18 million people voted, and this was the first time that young adults 18 years of age were entitled to vote.

The inclusion of the latter voters caused the census of 23,935,100 persons who could vote in 1977 to increase to 26,852,885 this year.

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However, whereas in 1977 only one out of every five persons abstained from voting, that percentage has now risen to one out of every three. The 21.6 percent abstention of 2 years ago has increased to 33.6.

A certain amount of weariness caused by the fact that Spaniards have been called upon to vote four times during the past 2 years, the disillusionment over past parliamentary performance and the persistence of the serious problems of unemployment, terrorism and inflation have been cited as the most direct causes of the abstention from the polls.

Voting Discipline

Another feature has also made this year's elections different from those of 1977: the greater abundance at present of political options, particularly in the leftist spectrum; because a total of 12 communist parties, four socialist parties and 18 parties of other leftist organizations appeared, as did 16 right center, and six right and extreme right parties, and also many other organizations of a local and regional nature.

And there was still another difference: Unlike the situation 2 years ago, the senators appeared for the 1 March elections backed by the parties; and the voting discipline operated to such an extent that the senator with the most votes on 15 June 1977, the Catalanian Benet, came out last in Barcelona, and just barely, having been backed by only one party.

The different strategies of the parties did not make any substantial change in the correlation of parliamentary forces. The UCD's "continue governing," or the PSOE's "new alternative in government," or the CD's being "indispensable in the government," and the communists' strategy of precluding the PSOE government only succeeded in outlining a political spectrum very similar to that of 2 years ago.

However, some paradoxes resulted from the strategies. For example, the communist vote declined in the two key regions of Workers Committees [CO]: the Basque Country and Catalonia.

And the PSOE lost status in regions with serious unemployment and terrorist problems, such as Andalusia and the Basque Country, despite the fact that the issues were major ones in its electoral campaign, and, in both regions, the PSOE was in the majority in 1977, and the two autonomous entities were headed by socialists.

But in the regions where unemployment and terrorism are the major problems being confronted, there was a spectacular gain for the nationalist parties: the "abertzales" [patriots] in the Basque Country, and Rojas Marcos' Andalusian Socialist Party [PSA] in Andalusia, where it managed to seat five of its candidates in congress.

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And the disappointment of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party was not much greater than that of the Communist Party which, although its leaders boasted over the success accrued in the previous elections in Euskadi, for example, did not win a single deputy. Nor did the communists manage to enter the doors of the Senate, from which they are absent.

The election of 1 March likewise demonstrated that Francoism as an electoral force has been reduced to a very slight factor, because the Democratic Coalition lost nearly a third of the votes that it had won in 1977.

A large number of the votes lost by Popular Alliance appear to have gone to the Democratic Center Union; which implies that there has been a shift to the right on the part of the centrists insofar as the composition of their electorate is concerned.

All the information and graphics were prepared by us, and were devised on the basis of provisional data of 7 January.

Votes Won By Parties and Coalitions (in thousands of votes)

1. UCD [Democratic Center Union]: 6,240
2. PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]: 5,420
3. PCE [Spanish Communist Party]: 1,915
4. CD [Democratic Coalition]: 1,021
5. CU [Convergence and Unity](Catalonia): 470
6. UN [National Union]: 382
7. PSA [Socialist Party of Andalusia]: 330
8. PNV [Basque Nationalist Party]: 274
9. PTE [Spanish Labor Party]: 194
10. HB [Herri Batasuna] (Basque Country): 173
11. PSOE(h) [Spanish Socialist Workers Party (historical)]: 136
12. ER [Republican Left] (Catalonia): 120
13. ORT [Workers Revolutionary Organization]: 118
14. EE [Euskadi Left]: 90
15. MC-OIC [Communist Movement-Communist Left Organization]: 87
16. UPC [Canary People's Union]: 60
17. IR [Republican Left]: 59
18. BEAM [National Liberation Left Bloc]: 56
19. PC [Carlist Party]: 54
20. PCT [Communist Workers Party]: 52
21. LCR [Revolutionary Communist League]: 48
22. PAR [Aragonese Regionalist Party]: 38
23. UFV [Basque Statutory Union]: 35
24. FE-JONS(a) [Traditional Spanish Falange and Falange of the National Trade Union Action Juntas (authentic)]: 32
25. UPN [Navarre People's Union]: 29
26. OC/BR [Communist Organization of Spain-Red Flag]: 28
27. UCE [Communist Union of Spain]: 24
28. PL [Liberal Party]: 17
29. PS [Sindicalist Party]: 10
- Others: 88
- Total valid votes cast: 17,600

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Chart 1.

A Total parlamentarios (Congreso + Senado)			
	1977	1979	Diferencia
UCD	274	287	+ 13
PSOE	183	189	+ 6 (1)
PCE	21	23	+ 2
CD	18	11	- 7

1 (1) Están sumados los parlamentarios del PSP y los senadores socialistas aunque sus candidaturas fueran con otros nombres en 1977. Si sólo se consideraran parlamentarios del PSOE en grupos parlamentarios socialistas, el Partido Socialista Obrero Español habría ganado, en 1979, un total de 23 escaños más en lugar de los seis indicados.

Key:

A. Total members of Parliament (Congress + Senate)

1. The PSP members of Parliament and the Socialist senators are combined, although their candidacies had different names in 1977. If only the PSOE members of Parliament in Socialist parliamentary groups were considered, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party would have won a total of 23 additional seats instead of the six indicated, in 1979.

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Chart 2.

**A Desproporción entre porcentajes
de votos y escaños**

	3 4 1977 5			1979		
	Votos (%)	Escaños (%)	Diferencia (%)	Votos (%)	Escaños (%)	Diferencia (%)
UCD	34,7	47,1	+ 12,6	35,5	47,7	+ 12,2
PSOE (1) ..	33,7	35,4	+ 1,7	30,8	34,6	+ 3,8
PCE	9,2	5,7	- 3,5	10,9	6,3	- 4,3
CD (2)	8,3	4,6	- 3,7	5,8	2,6	- 3,2

1 (1) Sumados, en 1977, los 799.376 votos del PSP-US y sus seis escaños.
2 (2) En 1977, AP.

Key:

A. Disproportion between percentage of votes and seats

1. The 799,376 votes of the PSP-US and their six seats combined, in 1977

2. In 1977, AP [Popular Alliance]

3. Votes


4. Seats

5. Difference

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Chart 3.



Key:

1. Congreso: Deputies According to Regions and Nationalities

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Chart 4.

Composición del Senado A		
	1977	1979
UCD	108	119
PSOE (1)	59	68
PCE	1	-
CD (2)	2	2
CU (3)	2	1
PNV	5	8
EE	1	-
HB	-	1
2 Designac. Real	41	-
3 Otros	29	8
4 Total senadores	248	208
1 (1) Sumado PSP. (2) En 1977, AP. (3) En 1977, DC.		

Key:

A. Composition of the Senate

1. (1) PSP added. (2) in 1977, AP [Popular Alliance]. (3) In 1977, DC [Catalonian Democracy ?]

2. Real Designation

3. Others

4. Total number of senators

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Chart 5.

Los diez senadores más votados ¹				
Nombre	N.º votos	Partidos ²	Circunscripción ³	
Francisco Bustelo	688.427	PSOE	Madrid	
Josep Andreu Abello	678.057	PSOE	Barcelona	
Armando Benito	643.057	UCD	Madrid	
José Prat	636.738	PSOE	Madrid	
Alexandre Cirici	631.357	PSOE	Barcelona	
Alonso Puerta	629.485	PSOE	Madrid	
Joan Casanellas	603.597	PSOE	Barcelona	
Josep Benet	567.940	Indep.	Barcelona	
Alfonso Cuco	383.520	PSOE	Valencia	
José Baguena	368.719	UCD	Valencia	

Key:

A. The 10 senators winning the most votes

1. Name

2. No of votes


3. Parties

4. District

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
Map 1.



Key:

1. Seats
2. Winner
3. Won seats
4. Democratic Center Union

Map 2.




Key:

1. Seats
2. Winner
3. Won seats
4. Spanish Socialist Workers Party

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
Map 3.



Key:

1. Won seats
2. Communist Party of Spain, Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia

Map 4.




Key:

1. Won seats
2. Democratic Coalition

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Map 5.




Key:

1. National and Regional Parties

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Graph 1.




Key:

1. Electoral participation
2. Abstention
3. Valid [votes]
4. Invalid [votes]
5. Blank [votes]

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Graph 2.



Key:

A. Political composition of the votes

1. No of voters

2. No of votes

3. Right

4. Left

5. Center


6. Regional

7. Others

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Graph 3.



A. Political composition of the Congress

1. Right

2. Right Center


3. Left

4. Two independents were added to the UCD parliamentary group. Four PSP deputies were added to the 118 from the PSOE.

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Graph 4.



Key:

A. Percentage of abstentions

1. Political reform referendum, 15 Dec 76
2. General elections, 15 Jun 77
3. Constitutional referendum, 6 Dec 78
4. General elections, 1 Mar 79

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

ARTICLE LOOKS INTO REASONS FOR PSOE LOSSES

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 18 Mar 79 pp 18, 19, 21-23, 25

[Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] The PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] did not win the elections, either in seats--which it did not count on--nor in popular votes--which it did expect to win. It has 4 years now to correct its mistakes and hopes to win then.

They were all there. On the morning of Friday, 2 March, the executive board of the PSOE was seated at the table on the first floor of its headquarters at 165 Calle Garcia Morato, beyond the posters, beyond the slogans, the withered roses, the uninhibited shouts of /Felipe for president!/ and the unopened bottles of champagne.

Guillermo Galeote, secretary of propaganda and one of the people directly responsible for the electoral campaign, opened the sheet of results. The PSOE column was not empty but there were large gaps in Andalusia and Pais Vasco, few votes in Valencia and the three insular provinces, the same as before in Catalonia and, finally, more votes in central and western Spain--New and Old Castile, Galicia and Extremadura.

Carmen Garcia Bloise, secretary of administration and finance, has the ability to not move a muscle, no matter what happens. She listened to the reading of the results with supreme coolness, her hands folded. Jose Maria Benegas--/Txiki/--secretary of youth relations, did not believe it. Enrique Mugica, secretary of political relations, saw stars of red, white and green as if he had almost drowned or been hit on the head. Alfonso Guerra, secretary of organization and the man most responsible for the electoral campaign, threw himself back in his chair, stretched his legs and tried to relax. He raised his right hand to his chin--an unconscious gesture, almost a

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tic--and his long forefinger rested on his lips. /We have not won, no./

Felipe Gonzalez, first secretary of the PSOE, was acclaimed, praised, envied, coveted and lamented throughout 20 days of hard campaigning from here to there, from meeting to meeting, favorite and spoiled son of 100 years of honesty and firmness, the one in whom Pablo Iglesias would have placed all his hopes. Now he is not going to invoke the Moncloa pact, is not going to tell Ceballos /I am sorry, you will have to deal with us/ because Ceballos will not need to deal with them.

Fear of Change

"None of us expected to win in the sense of obtaining the absolute majority in Congress. We calculated that there were 300 seats to be divided among the UCD [Democratic Center Union], PSOE and CD [Democratic Convergence]. And there were. However, we gave CD between 20 and 25 seats which would have left 150 for the UCD and up to 145 seats as maximum for us or 130 in the worst of cases. The mistake was not to foresee the damage of the CD which enlarged Suarez' group," Julio Feo, sociologist and Felipe Gonzalez' coordinator of public appearances during the campaign, told this magazine.

But the socialists do not feel that they have lost these elections. "We have not won them--that is different--but we have not lost," Javier Solana, press secretary and member of the executive board of the PSOE, said. The official explanation of the results, according to Miguel Moler and Pedro Paramo who wrote this report, is summarized in a few words: fear of change.

Julio Feo insisted that fear cemented the right to the UCD. "For example, in Suarez' last speech on television, he acted demagogic and provoked a vote of fear. The fear of change affected many of our 1977 voters--the petite bourgeoisie with a high cultural level--and they voted conservative this time. In 1977 it was necessary to bring about democracy; it was almost necessary to vote Francoist or anti-Francoist so they voted for the PSOE. This time it was necessary to choose between continuing with the known or voting for a change. They did not want to know anything about that so the UCD sounded better to them."

General Dishonesty

In the interminable press conference--almost 3 hours--that Felipe Gonzalez held with reporters on Saturday, 3 March, the socialist leader went further and spoke of the general dishonesty of the UCD antisocialist campaign. He cited examples like the arrest of the

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candidate in Guipuzcoa, Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity). Telesforo Monzon was used to strengthen the image of the UCD and its government in the antiterrorist fight and the use of photographs and movies of Suarez with the King were used as if the latter supported Suarez.

According to Felipe Gonzalez, the UCD was very irresponsible in these cases in order to win the vote of fear and take votes away from the PSOE. "We, on the other hand, made a civic presentation to solve the serious problems of this country at their roots. In Pais Vasco, for example, we tried to prevent radicalization. The UCD insulted Benegas because he spoke of dialoging with the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] and now they have them in the Parliament. At meetings I publicly asked for support for the forces of public order. This was risky because, in some ways, it demanded a lot from our electorate but, nevertheless, they applauded."

Go to the Opposition

"For those reasons, I have not congratulated Suarez. I am happy about the success of the UCD and I hope that it governs this country as it should. We socialists promise that we will not force early elections but will wait for 4 years of UCD government because we believe that the country deserves this period of stability. We go to the opposition which does not hurt us. But I have not called nor am I going to call Suarez to congratulate him because he acted dishonestly. He cannot state, as he has, that the UCD victory consolidates a certain model of democracy because it does not have any model. It would suffice for me to remind him, to show him, that barely 3 years ago I was the secretary general of the PSOE and he had the same position in the National Movement. I am speaking of 3 years ago when the old man was already dead and buried. Nevertheless, we did not bring any of this out in the campaign."

"I prefer not to speak of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party]." The socialists are "burned" by the communist campaign, by the injuries of leftist comrades who added to the motto of /100 years of honesty and firmness/ the marginal note of /and 40 years of vacation/.

"The old socialists who have fought for democracy, who have suffered imprisonment and exile, do not deserve that." To Felipe Gonzalez, the PCE campaign was shamefully dirty.

There Were Also Mistakes

Francisco Bustelo, new senator from Madrid and the person who won the largest number of votes in all Spain, thinks that the "relative" electoral loss of his party might have been due to an overly triumphal and superficial presentation. "The conviction that we were

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going to win the elections spread throughout the party and we presented ourselves as little more than a short-term alternative to solve the pending problems. Since this presentation was not convincing because there are no miraculous solutions to unemployment, for example, there were people who, reluctantly no doubt, chose the known evil."

Bustelo felt that there might have been some haste in the presentation of the socialist bid for government. "The benefits of the left come from advocating ethical changes in the country, seeking in the people the fiber of generosity and solidarity during a difficult political and economic situation. But it became a technocratic campaign."

In the meeting of the executive board, the crestfallen socialist leaders tried to outline some reasons to explain to themselves why they did not win. "Yes, where we had maximum responsibility in the preautonomous regions, we lost positions. It is clear that in Pais Vasco and Andalusia and partially in Valencia, the UCD government did not want to give political content to centers of power that it did not dominate. We have not been able to do anything concrete facing terrorism in Pais Vasco or unemployment in Andalusia; we have not been able to do more than give statements. We have exhausted ourselves with words."

Now it turns out that the stem of the rose did have thorns and that the road was not strewn with rose petals. The leaders placed the target very high and in the end did not even graze it. "We have cheated the voters and we have cheated the members but the curious part of the case is that everything seemed to indicate that we were going to win."

When the campaign began, the PSOE simply wanted to make a large bet that they were heading for the government--unstoppable--with a serious party program and a different option of exercise of power.

"As the days passed, we ourselves warmed up; we began to believe that we could attain even more. There are the polls that do not lie; 3 days before the elections they had us equal with the UCD. Now it is very easy to say that our own enthusiasm scared the electorate," said a member of the executive board.

Javier Solana was not completely in agreement with that analysis. "We never said that we were going to win more seats than the UCD. I would like it remembered that the most we dared to say was that we would win in popular votes. I deny that ours was a triumphal campaign; I deny that the executive board gave the feeling that we coveted the ministries. We presented a bold but not foolhardy campaign because we thought that the people were ready for change."

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Open Breaches

This theory seems to be part of the official version but from Solana, it is more credible. "I believe that this was the time to displace the right. In fact, we did displace the right from its traditional fiefs, not totally but we opened breaches in the two Castiles, in Galicia and in Estremadura and that was very difficult. This was a positive aspect of the elections for us."

"We had to be bold if we wanted to take a giant leap," Solana continued, "to elect 140 deputies, to keep the UCD from governing alone. But, of course, we should have protected our positions in other areas." That is where Solana introduced the argument of fear.

Campaign Approved

The truth is that perhaps the socialists are harder on themselves than the rest are. Pedro Semperu, 36 years old, has spent 14 years in public relations; he is a specialist in semiological studies and creative director of an important firm that does not do political publicity because its statutes prevent it. He believes that "the PSOE campaign was good, solid, consistent and unidirectional. It was perhaps the best of all. Thus it is necessary to look for other causes for the PSOE loss--although I prefer to call it the /nonvictory/--than the campaign."

Miguel Martinez Cuadrado, professor of political law and electoral sociology, also had a good opinion of the results obtained by the PSOE. "What has to be the prime concern to all parties is abstention which was very high. But I would not call it a socialist loss. It would certainly be a disappointment because there were swollen expectations based on unreliable polls. Also the campaign presentation was harmful for the PSOE. The socialists presented themselves as an alternative because the electoral system invites the alternation of two parties in power. But the UCD was not trying for that but for hegemony, aided by the PCE in its attacks on the PSOE. I conclude, consequently, that the present electoral law must be changed."

Identity Problem

Professor Dieter Nohlen, assistant director of the Political Science Institute of the University of Heidelberg (FRG), felt that the elections meant "a consolidation of the forces of the left and, generally, of the structure of the Spanish electorate. As to the PSOE, it can still expand its positions."

Josep Maria Valles, professor at the Autonoma of Barcelona and director of the electoral sociology team, felt that the PSOE results of

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the elections "are part of the general problem of the European left in finding its image during a total international economic crisis; it has an identity problem aggravated by the interclassist positions that the right adopts in order to adapt itself to that same crisis."

Heads to Roll?

The professorial explanations sound like nonsense to the members. "Too much theory," they told CAMBIO 16. "It is necessary to question some concrete actions like those of Enrique Mugica or Alfonso Guerra."

Javier Solana flatly denied that there had been any quarrel that Friday at the meeting of the full executive board. However, other sources stated that comrade Felipe had some words with comrade Enrique. "The press conference which Mugica held with Martin Villa on the subject of terrorism cost us at least one deputy in Guipuzcoa."

The criticism also extended to Mugica's determination to head the slate in Guipuzcoa, the district of the radical /abertzales/, after the public confrontations that the socialist leader had recently with the Basque nationalist sectors.

"The Guipuzcoa slate should have been headed by Benegas and even then we might have been hurt," socialist sources commented to CAMBIO 16, "because we have committed mistakes here. We did not even elect Eduardo Lopez Albizu, secretary of union relations for the party, who is from Portugalete and was third in Vizcaya."

In Madrid it was lamented that the socialist attempt to serve as a bridge between the native community and the emigrant group did not work. "We lost votes on two sides--the nationalist and the unionist," members of the executive board recognized.

It is true that an important debate has just begun in Basque socialism about which side it must lean toward because the role as bridge that it wanted to assume served only to provoke accusations of ambiguity.

It is better not to mention Andalusia. "This has been mentioned to us a lot because the key positions of the executive board are dominated by Andalusians: Felipe Gonzalez, Alfonso Guerra, Luis Yanez, Guillermo Galeote, Rafael Ballesteros...."

Pay the Bill

Alejandro Rojas-Marcos, leader of the PSA [Socialist Party of Andalusia] (which now prefers to call itself PSA-Andalusian Party) and center of the greatest electoral surprise to everyone except himself,

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found the results perfectly logical. "They believed that the Andalusian option ended on 15 June 1977. They campaigned here not to save Andalusia but to go to the government which was a mistake. On the other hand, we have spent 15 years demanding the identity of the Andalusian people and now the people recognize us as their specific defenders," he told Santiago Traver of CAMBIO 16 in Seville.

"The Pact of the Betis"

The Madrid Socialist Federation was not especially satisfied either with the interest that the head of the slate for Madrid, Felipe Gonzalez, took in its electoral district. "It was assumed that we had to win totally and this was not true."

Many socialists complained that in Madrid the alliance with the extinct PSP [People's Socialist Party] was not noted at all. "Those votes went to the UCD and the PCE and very few remained with Tierno." This was more or less the same thing that happened throughout Spain but the Madrid PSOE complained about it.

If the Basque and the Andalusian results are compared--as some people have done--more than one socialist member thinks that what actually failed is what the incorrigible Pablo Castellano baptized /the pact of the Betis/, the understanding between Basques Nicolas Redondo and Enrique Mugica Herzog. It put on the scale the strength of the General Union of Workers and the understanding with the Germans and Sevillians Felipe Gonzalez and Alfonso Guerra who offered a new image of the party and a demonstrated organizational ability to improve the deteriorated situation in which the old members had left the Socialist Party in the interior.

"An overall analysis has to lead us to the conclusion that an entire party policy has failed. Its errors were excessive centralism, decision-making from above, lack of participation of the members, elimination of the critical spirit, forgetting laborism, etc. All these matters will have to be aired in the next congress."

Senator Francisco Bustelo, considered a radical within the party and a member of the executive board who was fired-resigned along with Pablo Castellano because of the Basque-Andalusian push, was not completely in agreement with that analysis from other socialist sectors, but he recognized that the party has to criticize itself and restudy many questions.

Bustelo noted: "We have to reflect seriously on the fact that the right has not only won the elections but it has managed to capitalize on the end of the dictatorship. The left has been forced to moderate its demands and to support the passage toward democracy, precisely to avoid any risk of regression in this delicate process."

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"If we had won, we could have spoken of the brilliant foresight of the left to have accepted a process of slow change and to have capitalized on it to accede finally to the government with guarantees of remaining in it. However, the left lent its support of democracy to the right without knowing how to explain to the people all the risks and the sacrifices that they have had to face and without having explained to them the advantages that they consciously gave to the right. Thus the right exited unharmed, with its political and economic means almost intact, from 40 years of a dictatorship with which it actively collaborated."

Excessive Utopianism

Bustelo combined this inability of the PSOE to unmask the right with the excessive utopianism of the objectives of the electoral campaign to explain the relative electoral loss. However, also, "those two aspects combine with an evil that has afflicted us recently-- excessive homogenization of the party. It was not easy to go from a party with a few hundred members to a party of the masses with 100,000 members and 2,000 local groups. That evil (Bustelo did not want to speak of control) has hindered the strengthening of the organization and maximum exploitation of the most valuable element of socialism: its members and sympathizers."

Javier Solana, member of the executive board and included, therefore, in the general criticism of Bustelo, was ready to admit that it has operated perhaps in a "nonsocialist" style.

Solana said: "We tried the frontal attack against the right with the conviction that society wanted change which today only we, the socialists, can offer. We did not achieve this but I believe that ours was not a foolhardy proposal. There were sufficient reasons to deduce that society was inclined in that direction, that the Spanish society as a whole is progressive."

Return to the Sources

"But we have verified that it still fears change, it has been frightened, and the right has exploited that fear," Solana meditated out loud. "We have 4 years now. We will act with the method that the Socialist Party has used historically: to change society, to impregnate it with socialism, to open more Houses of the People, to reach all the corners of the country, to spread out the culture, to fight against corruption and to make honesty a goal of all the people. If we had won, we would have done all this from the top. Now we will do it from below."

Alfonso Guerra's phrase that "the people have lost a historic opportunity," a disagreeable phrase to many socialists, remains behind.

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The Rose Has Not Died

The general elections remain behind. In the campaign the PSOE leaders gave the sensation of being in a hurry to occupy ministries.

A year and a half of consensus remain behind which the socialists feel were harmful for them but they accepted it for the sake of the approved constitution and they defended it as their style of politics.

Many mistakes in the treatment of the autonomous problems remain behind which seemed to belie the federalist vocation of the PSOE.

"We have 4 years of improvement left. We will win in 1983." Javier Solana smiled openly.

Alfonso Guerra: "Spain Believed That We Were Going to Win"

In a very small office, 2 by 3 meters, Alfonso Guerra, secretary of organization of the PSOE and the one responsible for its electoral campaign, emerged from behind the little table filled with books, papers, reports and press clippings.

He bore it all, supervised it all, did it all. In addition, he held 45 meetings in his electoral district--Seville--during the 20 days of campaign, took care of the national campaign from his office in Madrid, prepared for the next party congress in May and read several books, the last being "Variaciones psicoanaliticas sobre un tema de Mahler" by Theodor Reik, published by Taurus.

CAMBIO 16: In Seville, the PSOE lost a seat at the expense of the PSA.

Alfonso Guerra: We won in Seville, in all the places where I held meetings. The PSA won more votes than anyone, even more than the UCD in Eciija and El Viso del Alcor where it had the first two candidates. This helped it. I say that the PSOE has not lost a seat but the PSA won it with a demagogic and shameful campaign but it won.

CAMBIO 16: In Pais Vasco, the PSOE suffered a notable regression.

Guerra: Abstention hurt us, the fact that everyone went against us hurt us, the irresponsibility of the UCD hurt us and having to preside over a preautonomous region in Andalusia which this government torpedoed because we headed it hurt us....The communications media--the public ones, of course, but also private ones like CAMBIO 16--hurt us.

I only hear questions about these cases but not about other regions. Now we are further ahead than we were on 15 June. We have achieved

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the global implantation of the party in all Spain; we have opened breaches in the right's fiefs. That is good for us. One seat where we did not have any is more valuable than an additional seat where we had four.

CAMBIO 16: What has failed then?

Guerra: In every electoral process, the vote is decided based on three things: identification with the party, the stimuli that are received and reflection on the consequences of the vote. The degree of voter identification with the PSOE is satisfactory; we have maintained our percentage of votes.

The stimulus during the campaign was strongly in favor of the PSOE. The feeling of a winner was created between the party and the voters. The possibility of winning in absolute terms was within reach and that created a sudden change. Perhaps we should have slowed down but it was impossible.

That change was unstoppable. Many were frightened; they believed that a socialist government was possible. Many people identified that fear with what Suarez inferred in his last speech on television. Suarez did not provoke fear of the PSOE but he had it, showed it and many people identified with him.

CAMBIO 16: Then the socialist campaign should have anticipated that reaction. Wasn't it a foolhardy campaign?

Guerra: Foolhardy? The polls told us that we were winning seats, that the electorate identified more and more with us. All Spain believed that we were going to win. It was not a belief of four crazy men meeting in our offices. We connected with the people.

Thus I said that a historic opportunity has been lost because after having fascinated society with the idea of change, part of that society became frightened. Of course, that first phrase was isolated from the context in which I said it.

CAMBIO 16: And now what?

Guerra: Well, we go to the responsible opposition and we go on to convince the country of the ethical revolution that has to occur, to raise the moral awareness of the people, to make the worker aware that he cannot collect unemployment insurance and have a job secretly. We will have a party like the Austrian Socialist Party that moves 1 million citizens in the elections and campaigns door to door, family by family.

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That takes time; to impregnate socialism and honesty in a society that inherited the corruption of the dictatorship takes time. However, I would again do what we have done. The train of change passed by and we had to do everything possible to catch it.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SWEDEN

BOFORS CHIEF DISCUSSES ARMS EXPORT TRADE

Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 22 Feb 79 p 35-37

[Article by Goran Jonazon: "Bofors Must Double Arms Export"]

[Text] "Bofors must almost double its export of defense equipment in the next few years in order to compensate for shrinking Swedish defense orders," said Bofors chief Claes-Ulrik Winberg. "The very life of the concern depends on the production--and export--of arms."

Bofors chief Claes-Ulrik Winberg is widely known as a kind man, who is objective about his job. But that does not mean he is afraid to speak out or stick out his chin when confronted with the new "popular tenets" in the defense debate, for example.

"There is much talk about alternative production in the defense industry today," he said. "As far as Bofors is concerned, my only comment is--forget it!"

According to Claes-Ulrik Winberg, butter cannot replace cannons in Karlskoga.

"That is an impossibility," he said. "Everything else is just wishful thinking, which serves no practical purpose. Bofors now employs 8,500 in Karlskoga, of which 5,000 are involved in the production of defense equipment, 1,500 in the chemical sector and 2,000 in the steel sector. But there is a direct connection between these areas of activity. Arms constitute the basic production, which holds the company together. Chemicals and steel are functions of the arms production, so to speak."

By eliminating the arms sector, they remove the basis for both chemicals and steel.

Furthermore, they have problems with the steel sector and it will eventually be phased out or restructured. Despite increased sales of roughly 20 to 600 million kronor last year, the result is negative. Losses, which in 1977 amounted to 54 million kronor, will be about the same for 1978, according to

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VECKANS AFFARER's estimates. The steel sector reduced its employees by 150 in 1978.

Developments in the chemical sector, on the other hand, were positive, both with respect to sales and results. Sales which were developed in this area a few years ago will continue, not least in the United States. However, the chemical sector is closely tied to arms production. And, in spite of the improved sales in the chemical sector, it can hardly remain independent of defense equipment production--at least not without considerable restructuring.

Hence, Bofors as a whole is dependent upon the production of defense equipment. Bofors could be in a difficult position due to the greatly reduced volume of domestic arms sales, but the company has been very successful in the export market area and currently has orders extending over the next 4 years, according to Claes-Ulrik Winberg.

"As we clearly see from incoming orders, there is a large global need for our products," said Claes-Ulrik Winberg. "Orders are also gradually increasing in one sector as we lose them in another. Our investment program also tells the message of our belief in the future. Having invested 129 million kronor in new construction already, we decided to invest another 134 million kronor last year."

Bofors is doing well in spite of reduced defense spending in Sweden, which is one of the company's largest customers.

Due to the greatly reduced appropriations for defense materials in Sweden, Bofors' domestic sales will decline from approximately 500 to 600 million kronor per year over the last few years to 100 to 200 million kronor per year over the next few years.

The company's total sales today (1978) are approximately 2.7 billion kronor and, directly or indirectly, about 50 percent of these sales must represent defense equipment in order for Bofors to survive.

In the last few years about 50 percent of the company's arms production has been exported. In 1978 the sale of arms amounted to over 1.2 billion kronor. Sweden bought arms from Bofors for over 600 million kronor and thus half of the essential defense money came from the domestic market.

Export Should Be Increased by One Billion

With only 100 to 200 million kronor coming from the domestic market, Bofors' export must account for about 800 to 900 million kronor. It should preferably exceed one billion kronor.

This means that Bofors' annual export volume must equal Sweden's total arms export today.

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"Of course, we have long been aware of the expected cuts in Swedish defense spending and have acted accordingly," said Claes-Ulrik Winberg. "Our aim has been to stay somewhat ahead of the developments. Nobody knows how much money will be appropriated for national defense in Sweden in the future, but the way it looks now, we must export 80 to 90 percent of our arms production in order to maintain the present volume. I want to emphasize, however, that we had planned to develop the export market anyway."

This aim toward the export market will hardly aid Claes-Ulrik Winberg's popularity as far as the defense debate is concerned. At least not among those who demand that Sweden cut its already sharply reduced arms export to an absolute minimum.

"There is unparalleled bigotry in this issue," said Claes-Ulrik Winberg, sticking out his chin a bit farther. "Of course, there has to be regulations that coincide with the overall foreign policy and these regulations must also be adhered to. But interpretations cannot be made in absurdum. Most countries have a defense program, like Sweden. They should also have the opportunity to purchase the arms they deem necessary and be able to choose their business partners. We must also keep in mind that if a country wants to misuse its power and engage in war, it needs just as many trucks and potatoes as it does bullets and gunpowder."

In that connection Claes-Ulrik Winberg points to what is generally known as the Swedish inconsistency. "For example, we do not want to sell weapons to Cuba," he said. "But Cuba gets massive aid from Sweden and wages war on another continent--in Africa."

Growing Markets

Nevertheless, there is a growing "legal" market for Bofors and the Swedish defense industry. "Primarily in Europe," said Claes-Ulrik Winberg. "But an increasing number of foreign countries are also going democratic, which means that we could have more customers for our products. It is completely realistic to believe that we can make up in exports what we lose in domestic sales. However, this presupposes normalization of our export regulations."

The world's total export of defense materials (weapons systems only, not communications and the like) can be valued at 60 billion kronor today. There are five main exporting countries and, together, they provide 83 percent of the total export. This is the top list:

USA 23 billion kronor
Soviet Union 16 billion kronor
France 4 billion kronor
West Germany 3 billion kronor
England 3 billion kronor

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The largest importer is Iran, which before the crisis bought arms worth 6.5 billion kronor, primarily from the United States. Other large importers include Israel (4.2 billion), Iraq (3.4 billion) and Libya (3.3 billion). All of the large buyers are located in the Middle East. Sweden, with exports totaling one billion kronor (695 million kronor in 1977 and 502 million kronor in 1976) and supplying a large number of countries throughout practically the entire world outside the Middle East, is not even a dwarf among the giants.

According to Claes-Ulrik Winberg, however, there is still room for the Swedish defense industry on the export market because of its special competence and its weapons system, which perhaps more than those of any other country bear the mark of "self defense." This will become an increasingly important feature, especially for smaller nations, which want to avoid building defenses that could be characterized as aggressive.

"We know we have attractive products that will sell if we can only get permission to do so," said Claes-Ulrik Winberg. "We do not have to violate the regulations concerning our special defensive weapons system either. An air-defense cannon or missile is designed to stop attacking planes that fly across one's territory. They are not offensive weapons."

As far as Bofors is concerned, however, the strategy must remain offensive, according to Claes-Ulrik Winberg. He maintains it is best to avoid "subsidization" or being supported by federal subsidies. He does not want to think of Bofors in those terms.

"Look at the shipyards today," he said. "They are not selling more ships because they are government-owned. To sell below production costs with the aid of government subsidies only leads to the preservation of weak companies. Nobody benefits from that in the long run. Our planning must be offensive--and foresighted."

New Trump

In previous years Bofors manufactured a big seller on the world market. It was the legendary 40 millimeter air-defense cannon, which the company sold (or licensed) to many countries throughout the world, including the great powers. This cannon has now been improved, featuring advanced electronic sighting equipment.

But the significant new trump is Robot 70. This is a simple missile system (used in fighting low-flying airplanes), which can be carried by three soldiers and operated by one. The missile "rides" to its target on a laser beam.

"There is great interest in this weapons system," said Claes-Ulrik Winberg. "So far we have sold it to Sweden and Norway, but all indications are we will get orders from other countries this year."

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Robot 70 is now being tested by several NATO countries and this weapons system could become standard NATO equipment. If that happens, Claes-Ulrik Winberg definitely does not have to worry about the export volume for a long time to come--a normal series costs 100 million kronor. Missiles and missile systems will become key words for Bofors in the future.

"Together with Saab Scania we have established a special corporation, Saab Bofors Missile Corporation AB, which will develop the missile system. Marketwise, we will continue to be on the offensive with our missile system."

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COUNTRY SECTION

SWEDEN

JOBLESS RATE SHOWS FIRST SIGNS OF DROP

Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 22 Feb 79 p 7

[Text] Some 445,000 persons could not find regular work or were unemployed in January. We have thus reached a peak in the economic slump and a reversal is on the way. Employment agencies listed twice as many job openings at the end of January this year as in January last year.

It is very possible that the unemployment figures for January might be the worst in this economic slump. January is always the worst month of the year as far as employment is concerned and it is believed that industrial employment will pick up again sometime in 1979.

Unemployment figures changed very little in the last year. This was true of official unemployment figures as well as the sum of all the categories listed in the diagram, which do not have "normal" employment.

From January last year official unemployment figures went up by 7,000, to 117,000. The increase represented unemployment among youth--ages 16 to 24 being responsible for almost the entire increase.

But while official unemployment figures were held down by the 25-krona last year, the emphasis will be on service work this year. And if we total all those who are employed in service work, protected and half protected work etc. and include the growth in the labor market, the increase was quite moderate. The total figure rose from 290,000 to 296,000.

Without all the government aid measures, youth unemployment, in particular, would have been considerably higher. Between 1975 and 1979 the number of youth (16 to 24 years old) involved in service work grew from 3,000 to 41,000. There was not much change in the number of older persons involved in service work--figures rose from 13,000 to 19,000.

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Demand Increasing

There is still a downward trend in industrial employment, but this trend should reverse itself in 1979. The demand is already growing. Employment agencies listed twice as many job openings in January this year as in the same month last year.

This means we can expect a certain increase in industrial employment before the end of this year. It will hardly be more than one to two percent, i.e., 10,000 to 20,000 persons. Next year the increase could be much greater.

Many fear that industry's increased demand for workers will rapidly lead to a labor shortage and an increase in wages.

It is true that there are not that many workers available. Official unemployment in January only represented 2.8 percent of the labor force--a very low figure internationally. The average unemployment for all of 1978 was only 2.2 percent.

However, a large number of persons who are now involved in political service jobs will get into the regular labor market when the economic situation improves. If we include these categories, we should have 7.1 percent "unemployment" (296,000 persons). Of course, this figure cannot be compared with official unemployment figures in other countries. But the figure does show that there are almost 300,000 persons in the labor market who do not have "regular" jobs. Even if we disregard the 48,000 persons involved in protected or half protected work and several more in other AMS activities, there are still more than 200,000 persons who should be available for industrial recruitment.

There should be even more people available in the two top categories shown in the diagram: among the latent job seekers, who have not looked for a job but who are willing and able to work, and among the partially unemployed, who work part time because they cannot get full-time employment.

A More Sluggish Labor Market

But the labor market is, indeed, more sluggish now than it was earlier. Many do not want industrial employment. Others do not want or cannot move to another job. But it is still hard to believe that industry's rather moderate need for workers will not be satisfied in the next few years. There will be continued minimal use of capacity.

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